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Abstract: Containerised sea shipping plays a key role in the global 
trade and traffic, hence its relevance may not be underestimated in the 
global security. It shows specific vulnerabilities to harmful and illicit 
intentions to break the trade supply chain or simply attempting to use it 
as a tool to threaten security. A new era has arrived. Prior to 9/11 port 
operators and shipping companies handled the risks that threatened the 
supply chain security from an economic loss point of view while bor-
der control issues have traditionally focused on commercial illegality 
or smuggling of prohibited goods. The events of 9/11 however, high-
lighted the risk that supply chains might be abused by terrorists to 
cause enormous physical and economic damage. The event also 
pointed out many unhandled vulnerabilities that could provide extra-
ordinary opportunities for breaking the lines of defence. In response to 
that we have witnessed the proliferation of security-focused control re-
gimes worldwide. Following a series of comprehensive analyses, nu-
merous measures have been taken by national and international actors 
on different levels and points of the global trade supply chain. From all 
these efforts the clear intention arose that we need to safeguard global 
supply chains by evaluating advanced cargo scanning and data integra-
tion capabilities at overseas ports and inviting them into an operable 
international security system. 
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Introduction 
The terrorist attacks - now often referred to as September 11, or briefly 9/11 - 
has changed the world in many ways and its security, politics, law enforcement and 
intelligence aspects. Instead of a general overview however, this article is focusing 
only on the complex security problems of global containerised trade supply chains 
and aims to explore how they could be improvement. Nevertheless, 9/11 have not 
caused damages only, but it has triggered wide scale security revision that has re-
vealed the vulnerabilities of U.S. border protection, identified its organisational, insti-
tutional and technical roots. The number of security gaps that had been identified 
proves that this process was worthwhile. These findings supported numerous initia-
tives and technical development. In a nutshell, the issue of security in general and the 
developments in the different spheres of security industry gained priority. 
Even if the global trade supply chain constitutes just one from the above 
mentioned fields of security, this area has witnessed the most remarkable improve-
ments in the recent decade. 
As we will see later on, the United States has been the main driving force of 
these developments. Their ideas and developments in the field of security spread all 
over the world and influenced many other countries that have adapted their own sys-
  
tems accordingly and participate in security co-operations with their counterparts. 
This tendency is valid to many aspects of security development and may be con-
sidered as an absolutely positive phenomenon. 
Shipping profile 
 
It was not my objective to elaborate a comprehensive analysis of world trade 
and traffic, just to present some general and consciously not very detailed facts and 
figures that can provide a framework against which containerised traffic and besides 
sea-born container traffic may properly be evaluated. 
Shipping of goods is commonly measured in tonnes while the delivery distance 
in kilometres. Interestingly enough, recent global shipping figures suggest that some-
what 80 percent of global commodity traffic measured in tonne-kilometres is trans-
ported by sea.  
Commodity flow might be further categorised according to the character of the 
cargo such as bulk (liquid, dry), containerised, other combined ones like Ro-Ro, and 
so on. Surprisingly, if we look at the global trade from this perspective there is again a 
significant 80 percent share of containerised goods. These numbers indicate the rel-
evance of seaborne container traffic and its links going to, or coming from the inland, 
the multimodal container terminals, and elsewhere. 
 Estimates of the European Commission (EC) also underpin the relevance of sea 
shipping industry. For instance, in their report titled as “Strategic goals and recom-
mendations for the EU’s maritime transport policy until 2018” it is mentioned that 
short-sea shipping carries still 40 percent of intra-European freight where, of course, 
no distant sea shipping was taken into consideration.1  
Landlocked countries have somewhat different shipping profile, but surprisingly 
the share of sea shipping may grow up to 50 percent in their shipping performance 
measured also in tonne-kilometres. There are several landlocked countries in the 
European Economic Area (EEA) as well, so they had to work out their priorities and 
strategies, how they can get access to the global markets via seaports belonging to 
other countries. Even those countries that have access to the world sea trade through 
their own seaports have to pay attention how their inland agricultural and industrial 
products can reach the maritime shipping facilities at the seaports. 
The competitiveness of the production of goods and the internal market of 
countries are highly dependent on the reliability and expenditures of the shipping 
chain, through which they can access to the relatively cheap deep-sea shipping. 
 Commercial rail and inland waterway routes gained therefore more and more 
significance in the past few decades. The so-called Helsinki corridors became main 
subjects for the transportation development projects in the European Communities. 
All these ideas are highly motivated by cost-efficiency, reduction of energy needs and 
emission of greenhouse gases. 
There is no doubt that sea transportation has a core importance amongst the 
commodity transport modes globally, just as sea born container traffic has. This 
enormously large percentage taken from the global shipping industry alone generates 
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a continuous need for its characteristics to be analysed in order to be able to handle 
their risks properly.   
Dependency on shipping capabilities 
 
For Europe, shipping has been one of the key pillars to economic growth and 
prosperity throughout its history. Maritime transport services have always been essen-
tial in facilitating the European economy and European companies to compete glo-
bally. But Europe is not an exception, many other powers have strong dependency on 
the shipping capabilities, by which they can reach the world markets. Quality ship-
ping is a key global competitive advantage for those powers, which are in position to 
enjoy the moderate costs sea commodity shipping allows them.  
Trade among countries without a common border takes place mainly across the 
ocean. In particular, ocean shipping is the principle mode of transport for bulk com-
modities (such as oil, petroleum products, iron ore, coal and grain, etc). These repre-
sent a large share of trade in terms of weight, but a small and decreasing share in 
terms of value.2 
In the field of technological innovations, the most important driving forces of 
globalisation were the ones that improved the speed of transportation and communica-
tions and lowered their costs. These included the adoption of containerisation in inter-
national shipping.3  
Three important technological and institutional changes have lowered shipping 
costs: the development of open registry shipping (i.e. registering ships under flags of 
convenience to circumvent regulatory burdens and especially manning costs), scale 
effects from increased trade and containerisation. Standardised containers allow the 
use of a multi-modal transport system, without unpacking and repacking.4 
About 40 percent of all incoming trade to the United States arrives by ship, and 
most of that in sea containers.  Other countries, such as the United Kingdom, Japan, 
and Singapore, are even more dependent on sea container traffic.5 Containers became 
essential elements of the global logistic chain and therefore their characteristics have 
strong impact on the world commodity flow.  
Global pattern of container traffic 
 
Containers are undoubtedly the most successful innovation in the freight trans-
port sector in the 20th Century logistics. The global standardisation of shipping con-
tainers and container handling equipment triggered a revolutionary breakthrough in 
the character of the global logistic chain. In our time, container traffic represents a 
significant proportion within sea-shipping modes and is continuously increasing. 
Standard merchant containers have been invented in the 1950s and their use in global 
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cargo shipping has been spread continuously since the 60s. More than five million 
freight containers are now in service throughout the world. This became possible 
principally by the international standardization. Containerised intermodal freight sys-
tems have significant advantages against bulk and piece cargo shipping especially in 
relation to the modal changes. The wide-range use of containers led to the spread of 
combined, or often referred as intermodal shipping modes and resulted in quicker and 
cheaper modal changes that happens often three or four times in the distant and inter-
continental trade.  
Since perceptible international trade is dependent on maritime transport, an in-
crease in trade due to or as a means of globalization would naturally result in a cor-
responding increase in maritime traffic. Sea-born container traffic increased 10 per-
cent in average in the last decade except the year 2009, when a global economic crisis 
broke this trend temporarily.6 Available forecasts may vary, but we can say that the 
global ocean-borne commerce is expected to grow 3 to 4 percent annually into the 
foreseeable future.  
Higher traffic and commodity exchange volume means higher risks and greater 
exposure. More intense traffic means more opportunities for criminals, and certainly 
higher risk for the malfunction 
of the logistic system. At the 
planning phase of any trade 
supply chain security measure, 
therefore, a very detailed 
traffic pattern analysis is es-
sential. It is especially true in 
case of those global trends and 
dynamics that define the 
context of the container 
transportation system.  
Trade routes with over 
one million TEU are 
illustrated in the map below 
(see Figure 1). This indicates the scale of worldwide container traffic. Not surpris-
ingly the Far Eastern region is the busiest one, by 43,2 per cent of all worldwide con-
tainer trade that is going to, coming from or operating within there. These statistics 
were  prepared by the UK Department for Transport for their assessment report in 
2006, but the primacy of the Far Eastern region is still unquestionable, because almost 
every second container departs from there, arrives there or even circulates within that 
region. The second and the third busiest regions were the North American and West-
ern European areas in 2006 by their 14,9 percent each.7 All these cover 73 per cent of 
the global container traffic, and in the same time this figure shows the tripartite main-
stream in the global flow of containers. 
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Figure 1 - Global container, liquid 
and major dry bulks volumes 1990-
2010 (1990=100%) 
  
Since naval strategists like the American Alfred Thayer Mahan, the British Sir 
Julian Stafford Corbett and others drew the attention to the crucial role of the narrows 
and straits in the control of the global sea trade (which is certainly one of the core 
elements of the sea power), these focal points became important scenes of guarantee-
ing security. Who has power to keep these “bottle necks” under control, has the power 
to influence the whole system very effectively.  
Increased maritime traffic raises concerns about the safety of sea lines, of  
communication (SLOCs) and the transit through bottle necks — both from the safety 
of navigation and the environmental protection perspective as well as from a national 
security point of view. In light of the global terrorist threat, the security of the mari-
time transit lanes as well as the ports servicing international trade have become very 
serious concerns —concerns that were deemed almost inconsequential in the immedi-
ate post-Cold War years.8 
Figure 2 - Shipping route container flows greater than 1 million TEU 
 
Other bottlenecks might also be identified in the global system, in places where 
in a relatively small geographical area, a high intensity of commodities flows across. 
These points are the seaports. Not seaports in general, but the busiest ones, where the 
mainstream commodity flow of global trade is handled. Most of these locate at one of 
the above-mentioned three regions: in the Far East, North America and Western Eu-
rope. In the new container security programmes we have to bear in mind these focus 
regions, and we will see if they have done accordingly. 
Characteristics of commodity flow 
Professor Zoltan Lakner and Gyula Kasza from the Corvinus University ana-
lysed the global flow of foodstuffs. They pointed out in their article that there are fo-
cal points, mainstreams, minor flows and dead ends in the global food flow system. 
The international food supply chain changes time to time, creating new priority 
streams in the system. The European food map for instance showed the Netherlands 
and Germany as main centres of the commodity flow in 2008. Between these two 
entities were the most intensive relation meaning the highest volume of foodstuff ex-
change. This shape may be proven by the long distance shipping of processed food 
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products that went across the busy seaports of these countries. Rotterdam in the Neth-
erlands, or Hamburg in Germany were the most frequent entry points for the food 
traffic all over Europe in that year.9 Other focal points in Europe are such countries as 
France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Italy, Spain –have busy container ports. All of 
them may be found in the list of the “European top ten” ports. Container transporta-
tion system handles not food staff shipping only. That means other containerised 
cargo may be subjects of similar analyses and, probably our observations will fit for 
them too. 
Threats identified 
Piracy 
Throughout the history, pirates have always threatened the global sea transpor-
tation routes. It has been never happened the risk of piracy could reduce the states 
throughout their navies all over the world. The risk of piracy shows their specific pat-
tern, and got increased or reduced by factors such as geography, stability of states, 
capabilities of their navies end so one. However, it is maybe not accidental that some 
areas at straights and narrows and their proximity are frequent scenes of pirate at-
tacks, while others are not. 
The reduction of pirate threat belongs the main responsibilities of the navies as 
they protect merchant shipping. For instance the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean 
“Operation Active Endeavour” is going on from 2001 by the NATO navies, that was 
later extended to the whole Mediterranean,10 or “Operation Allied Protector” and its 
follow-up “Operation Ocean Shield” at the Horn of Africa – all are somehow related 
to 9/11.11 The tasks of prevent, or deter a pirate attack, or claim back a ship that was 
fallen in hands of pirates belongs to the navies. However practically no example is 
known, when a containership was taken and pirates or other unauthorised third party 
individuals could access to the cargo in containers. When the command of a ship is 
taken it does immediately mean pirates can access containerised cargo a board. This is 
because of the loading standards; the proximity between containers is a few milli-
metres typically. Containers are placed into cells and packed onto one another. The 
doors may not be opened like that for most of the containers, so there without port 
machinery pirates are not in the position to pilfer the cargo. 
Unauthorised access to the cargo has much higher risk when the container is at a 
terminal, at the customers’ side or even when transported on road or by rail. During 
sea transportation accidents have still higher risk than cargo became stolen by pirates. 
Vulnerabilities 
The relevance of containers in the global supply chain is becoming more and 
more important. It turns us towards the container traffic and urges us to follow its 
specific security vulnerabilities. One dimension comes from the intensity of the con-
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tainer traffic that flows across continents entering busy ports, intermodal hubs, termi-
nals, loading in and out to/from vessels, rail wagons, vehicles and so one all over the 
supply chain.  
While merchant containers are ideal means for transportation of goods, they are 
just as good for transportation of illegal substances, contraband and even for human 
beings (stowaways) all over the world. Organised criminals have learnt how contain-
erised logistic chain works and they have developed their facilities to exploit its op-
portunities well.12 In most of the contraband smuggling cases the law enforcement 
faces with many signs of organised crime. This is especially true in cases committed 
on high value goods like drugs, cigarettes, counterfeit commodities (intellectual prop-
erty theft), arms smuggling and similar ones, where a single perpetrator is inappropri-
ate to arrange the entire “project” and the supporting logistics alone. 
The problems of theft and smuggling demonstrate the relative ease with which 
criminal elements have capitalized on the use of containers as conveyances. Ano-
nymity of contents, opaque ownership arrangements for vessels, and corruption in 
foreign ports have all facilitated the efforts of those who are inclined to use container 
shipping for illegal purposes.13 
There are undeniable signs that criminal organisations started to act as transna-
tional enterprises. This segment of cross-border crime became international security 
threat as their capabilities developed, and in the same time, this pattern of organised 
crime raised the attention of international security analysts as well.  
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reports on illicit produc-
tion and trade of drugs on a yearly basis. They indicated for instance, that sea trade 
plays significant role in the international drug transportation networks.  This is espe-
cially true in the segments of cocaine and opiates, where containerised shipping is be-
coming more and more frequent.14 However, containers may be considered also as 
frequent delivery means for other types of illicit drugs as seizure statistic figures indi-
cate this in many member countries of the World Customs Organisation (WCO). 
WCO has also been monitoring and analysing by its Regional Intelligence and Li-
aison Offices the contraband seizures since the mid 2000. In their international seizure 
database called Customs Enforcement Network (CEN) more than 250 thousand re-
cords were entered until 2009, many of them were drugs. WCO releases on a yearly 
basis their analyst report on drugs, cigarettes smuggling and goods counterfeiting (in-
tellectual property theft). These reports written on the respective criminal segments 
are based on the member customs administrations’ intelligence shared in the CEN 
database and also the figures they provided. Therefore the reports became widely 
known analyst products by the law enforcement and security specialists. 
Many WCO member customs administration have developed specific know-
ledge base for container search, some released handouts, rummage guides, training 
materials and similar papers even, and included into their training programmes. One 
of the best-known container search handout was compiled in the Customs 2002 pro-
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ject of the EC Directorate General for Taxation and Customs Union (DG TAXUD). 
More over, this training material was put on e-learning basis for better accessibility of 
the member customs administrations.15 
Containerised transportation systems show their unique character along both 
arms of the logistic chain. On one hand containerised commodities flow to their desti-
nations – this is one arm often considered as the only one in the logistic chain. On the 
other hand, upon delivery at the destination of the cargoes, containers become un-
loaded and re-transported to container depots and terminals. The cyclic logistic chain 
starts again when maintenance is done if necessary and the customers (suppliers, 
manufacturers, wholesalers) are supplied with containers to be loaded with cargoes 
again. So there empty containers have their own logistic needs and this arm of the lo-
gistic chain is just as capable for illegal goods (e.g. contraband) delivery as the other 
one. 
The busiest container ports of the world have ten thousands throughput of con-
tainers daily, which is a logistic challenge itself. Port law enforcement agencies 
should identify the few ones posing threat for the countries or the logistic chain as an 
infrastructure. Instead of total control, modern border authorities especially Customs 
use selective control, targeting and profiling on a routine basis to find irregularities in 
the commodity traffic. The systematic application of such procedures and techniques 
are all based on intelligence and risk analysis, creating the frames of risk management 
system.16 This allows keeping the balance between trade facilitation and security. 
That means customs can target the high-risk consignments, traders, means of transport 
etc. deployed their resources effectively, while at the other hand they use simplified 
means and procedures for trade facilitation purposes, where applicable. So there, the 
security function of border control does not result unnecessary waste of time and not 
increases shipping costs for those entities of the trade supply chain, where all regula-
tions met and low risk level perceptioned by the law enforcement.   
The capacities of ports, container terminals and in general the border crossing 
points are limited, just as the law enforcement 
agencies’ resources are. So that it has crucial 
importance how these resources are deployed and 
the capacities used in order to get as good result 
as possible. 
Many people living in landlocked countries 
do not recognise the role of merchant seaports 
and the transportation routes landlocked countries 
can reach these gates of sea shipping (e.g. rail and 
inland waterways, motorways etc.). We have seen 
the importance of them at the introduction part 
this article. However I wonder to raise the 
attention to 
the different 
risk perception and in general, risk management 
approach how the law enforcement agencies estimate and handle risks for the same 
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Figure 3 - Helsinki corridors in Cent-
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shipment at the seaports and at the inland territories. 
I pointed out that significant portion of sea-born containers play role in the 
commodity transportation industry of the landlocked countries. Not quite rarely this 
may reach 50 per cent of the yearly transportation performance. The risk exposure 
rate of malfunctions or even cut of the supply chain due to an incident is also signifi-
cant for the landlocked countries. Therefore the security of the containerised transpor-
tation systems are just as high priority for them as the countries with sea access. This 
has still security and economic priorities. For the Hungarian point of view Hamburg, 
Koper, Rijeka, Constanta or even Thessaloniki are the most frequent seaports where 
the sea-born container traffic exchange flows across. Please see Figure 3 and follow 
the Pan-European transportation corridors for the different seaports. 
The availability and reliability of the access, its cost efficiency and time needs 
are not the only factors considered. Security had been promoted among them too, 
highly because of the lessons learnt from 9/11. If the mentioned seaports use the same 
security standards providing equal levels of security and access reliability, then time 
needs and cost efficiency can be considered the most. Time factor, however not so 
important at most of the containerised cargoes. Or at least the shipping time differ-
ence between the different transport modes are not so significant until a container can 
reach the mentioned seaports from the inland. 
To demonstrate the difference I took three transportation examples from the 
PINE Report – Prospects of Inland Navigation within the Enlarged Europe.17 
Case I: Containers from Rotterdam to Heidelberg (approx. 520 kms) 
Case II: Liquid bulk from Rotterdam to Vienna (approx. 1200 kms) 
Case III: Passenger cars from Austria to Romania (approx. 1250 kms) 
In these relations rail transportation had from plus 5 percent to minus 15 percent 
cost efficiency compared to the road transportation, but rail’s time needs were also 
significant 70 percent to 100 percent more than the tucks needs. This resulted for ex-
ample 4 days instead of 2 and similar. 
Inland waterway transportation system, where applicable, had 75 to 30 percent 
less costs compared to the road transportation, but the door-to-door time needs were 
2,2 to 4 times longer than road shipping. That means 3,5 days instead of 1,5 or 8 days 
instead of 2. This indicates the enormous capabilities of reducing shipping costs by 
taking inland waterway transportation in case of no tide shipping time. Exact expecta-
tions may be created from the data of a certain shipping assignment. 
Turning back to the security issues, the risk management systems used at the 
seaports are sensible for different risk indicators and factors from other inland count-
ries’ respective or counterpart agencies’ systems. Due to the limited resources port 
risk management has, they often consider low risk although the many risk indicators 
identified, because of the shipment’s consignee locates inland and the commodities 
leave the port under the responsibility of a freight forwarder considered as safe. Un-
economically routed container indicated with used, low value cargo for instance flows 
through the port security system, just because of the forwarding proposal indicates rail 
transportation service. This is considered as safe due to the rail forwarding company 
provided guarantee on the customs duties. However container was loaded with 
contraband cigarettes for example, which did criminals remove during the rail trans-
portation phase. In this case I put here for illustration purposes, customs is unable to 
keep real cargo under surveillance and is able to claim the freight forwarder’s guaran-
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tee funds solely, not the ones according to the real cargoes. I would have called many 
cases for further analysis here according to my own domestic and foreign experiences. 
Although this given, and some other scenarios may be identified as a real gaps, inland 
authorities have very little – if not at all - impact on the ports of entries at the same 
common customs zone to change their risk management system respectively. 
Security gaps may vary at the ports, many of them had been identified but not 
solved prior to 9/11. Peter Chalk browsed them in his article published in Loyd’s MIU 
Handbook. He groups the gaps into categories as follows, however the list is not ex-
haustive18: 
1.  The sheer volume of commercial freight that is moved by container ships effec-
tively eliminates the possibility of comprehensive checks once the cargo reaches 
its port of destination. Even in countries with advanced x-ray and gamma scan-
ning technologies, inspection rates remain minimal, usually not more than 10 
percent.  
2. The highly complex nature of the containerised supply chain creates lots of op-
portunities for terrorist infiltration. Unlike other cargo vessels that typically 
handle payloads for a single customer loaded at port, container ships deal with 
goods and commodities from hundreds of companies and individuals, which in 
most cases, are received and transported from inland warehouses characterised 
by varied on-site security. For even a standard consignment, numerous agents 
and parties would be involved, including the exporter, the importer, the freight 
forwarder, a customs broker, excise inspectors, commercial trucking firms, rail-
road, dockworkers, and possibly harbor feeder craft and the ocean carrier itself. 
Each point of transfer along this spectrum of movement represents a potential 
source of vulnerability for the overall security and integrity of the cargo, provid-
ing terrorists with numerous opportunities to “stuff” or otherwise tamper with 
the boxed crates. 
3. The primitive nature of the locks that are used to seal containers. Existing de-
vices offer little, if any protection, and often consist of nothing more than a 
plastic tie or bolt that can be quickly cut and then reattached using a combina-
tion of superglue and heat. Most commercial shipping companies have been re-
luctant to develop more resistant mechanisms, given the costs involved. A stan-
dard seal can be purchased for a few cents if ordered in bulk, whereas more ro-
bust versions might run to several hundreds of dollars. Moves to develop so-
called smart boxes equipped with global positioning systems (GPS) transpond-
ers and radio frequency identification devices (RFIDs) that emit signals if they 
are interfered with have run into similar problems and had not, at the time of 
writing, been embraced with any real degree of enthusiasm by the international 
maritime industry.  
4. The overall vulnerability of crated cargo is further exacerbated by the “Trans 
International Routier” (TIR) haulage system, which is used to transport such 
merchandise from warehouse to port. Any container bearing the TIR logo is as-
sumed to have had its contents inspected and sealed at source by relevant auth-
orities—a designation that precludes any additional checks before dockside 
loading. There are a variety of ways in which terrorists could compromise and 
exploit this internationally recognized arrangement for their own purposes, 
ranging from spray painting a false logo on the outside of a generic; preloaded 
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crate, to bribing officials to issue a TIR designa tion for a container that had al-
ready been tampered with; to stealing and “stuffing” one en-route to a port.  
5. The effectiveness of point-of-origin inspections for containerized freight is 
highly questionable. Many resource-constrained states in Asia and Africa fail to 
routinely check dockworkers, do not require that truck drivers present valid 
identification before entering an off-loading facility, and frequently overlook 
the need to ensure that all cargo is accompanied by an accurate manifest. Even 
richer nations in Western Europe and North America are not devoid of these 
types of deficiencies. Privacy regulations in the Netherlands, for instance, pre-
clude the option of comprehensive security checks for dockworkers without first 
gaining their permission. In the words of one Dutch expert, “I would be amazed 
if harbor employees at Rotterdam, Antwerp, or Amsterdam were required to 
undergo any form of mandatory background criminal check.” In the United 
States, about 11,000 truck drivers enter and leave the Long Beach terminal in 
Los Angeles with only a standard driver’s license, whereas Singapore, which 
runs arguably one of the world’s most sophisticated commercial maritime ter-
minals, does not require shipping companies to declare goods on their vessels if 
they are only transiting through the country’s port. That means that the gov-
ernment does not know what is being transported on the vast bulk of carriers 
that tranship through the city-state.  
6. The absence of uniform and concerted safeguards is problematic as it is vir-
tually impossible to inspect containers once they are on the high seas, while de-
laying checks until after they arrive at their destination may be too late to pre-
vent a terrorist event from occurring. The enactment of the International Ship 
and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code is designed to offset some of these prob-
lems by mandating a minimum set of requirements to govern the integrity of the 
maritime export-import chain; however, the initiative still suffers from a num-
ber of serious gaps. 
Even if the customs services of the landlocked countries are not in the position to in-
fluence efficiently other member states risk managements and procedures, where con-
tainerised cargo throughput crosses the customs borders, they have to raise a discus-
sion at the competent community forums.  
Additionally they have to find other choke points at their inland side of the sup-
ply chain to provide security. Independently from these, landlocked countries cus-
toms, and in general law enforcement agencies should know how seaports are operat-
ing, and which kind of selective control they can provide. The “gaps and lacks” must 
be considered at the development of their own system. 
Container shipping as a critical infrastructure 
Upon we pointed out countries’ dependency on the containerised cargo supply 
chains another approach has arisen concerning critical infrastructure protection. The 
idea of critical infrastructure protection within the security industry gained strong pri-
ority upon 9/11 and spread across the international security community. Researchers 
received support from the governments in many countries and its results have been 
implemented in the risk management systems of the catastrophe responders and the 
countries’ threat reduction and prevention mechanisms. 
Respectively, we do not turn here to a detailed analysis of critical infrastruc-
tures, just we allocate that there are many approaches and sometimes not even slight 
  
differences in the definition what infrastructure belongs to it.19 Known researchers of 
this issue put it that although no common definition and vocabulary have already 
worked out, there may be some group of joint criteria to be identified. 
Containerised shipping and trade supply chain has network pattern or chain 
structure. There is some interdependency with other sorts of infrastructures due to 
known links, dependency relations and interactivity. The interdependency should not 
necessarily be direct or close relationship between these infrastructures. It is not con-
ditional that a country or a group of countries should have located their critical infra-
structure within their own territory. Finally the infrastructure has a certain (but diffi-
cult to define as a finite) mass, goes beyond a certain limit that in case of cut off leads 
to a serious harm or damage. 
Taking these criteria together, we can identify and determine containerised trade 
supply chain as a critical infrastructure.  
Contradiction in critical infrastructure protection 
The interest and responsibility for the critical infrastructure protection belongs 
to the owners and operators belonging either to the state or the private sectors. This 
endorses the customers’ satisfaction, guarantees the service quality and supports the 
reliability as part of the company profile. Although no specific legal regulation are 
available in some cases, many owners and service operators recognised this and they 
developed their own security system and emergency procedures and voluntarily de-
velops them on their free will. The states and International Organisations task is to 
give motive and assistance to the service operators by creating clear legal background, 
handing over information necessary, developing specific financial sources for support 
programmes – briefly by creating inspiring environment for that.20 In contrast with 
these, profit maximisation is that keeps the entrepreneurial sector operational. This 
phenomenon equally works for the elements of the shipping industry as well. 
Port operations and technology are optimized so that ships spend a minimum 
amount of time at the quay and the maximum time en-route. The principal concern of 
business is to increase the efficiency of the global supply chain, paying comparatively 
little attention to security. In recent years, ocean carriers have cut crews to an absolute 
minimum and have continued to order larger and faster ships in an effort to squeeze 
every cent of profit from the system.21 Prior to 9/11, supply-chain security focused 
primarily on reducing shrinkage—the loss of cargo shipments through theft and mis-
routing. This risk motivated action in the private sector solely.  
These led, in short terms, to the neglect of security means and regulations. An 
accident or a security incident may cut the infrastructure in operation, the accessibility 
to the service. However, is the clear interest of the profit orientated economic operator 
to reduce the risks as low as possible of such a service cut or malfunction, because of 
the very serious economic loss and other consequences such events may probably re-
sult. 
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Megaterrorism scenarios 
Since the aftermath of 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, maritime se-
curity threats have been major sources of global anxieties considering the vulnera-
bility of the world’s oceans to maritime terrorism. Although historical and empirical 
evidences have indicated less terrorist attacks on seas before and after 9/11, there is a 
tremendous fear that maritime vessels and facilities are facing the awesome risks of 
maritime terrorism. This risk is aggravated by the fact that compared with the land 
and air, the “sea has always been an anarchic domain” that it is “barely policed, even 
today.” Moreover, the seas have become the medium of various transnational threats 
that undermine regional and global security.22 
Security of the system has traditionally focused on reducing shrinkage—the loss 
of cargo shipments through theft and misrouting. However, heightened awareness of 
terrorism has redefined supply-chain security—the consequences of an attack on or 
via a critical global port could be a tremendous loss of life and a crippling of the U.S. 
economy—and has brought increased attention to the risks containerized shipping 
presents.23 
Heightened awareness of terrorism has redefined supply-chain security and in-
creased attention to the risks containerised shipping presents. The west-coast port 
lockout of 2002 in the USA suggested the magnitude of economic effects a terrorist-
related event might cause. Estimates placed the losses for the ten-day lockout between 
4.7 billion and 19.4 billion USD.24 Booz, Allen and Hamilton reported in October 
2002 that a 12-day closure required to locate an undetonated terrorist weapon at one 
U.S. seaport would cost approximately 58 billion USD.25 
The Hungarian logistics security researcher Attila Horvath raised the attention 
in his article that such an attack against port infrastructure may cause serious damages 
along the whole logistic chain, even at their inland arms in landlocked countries.26 In 
May 2002, the Brookings Institution estimated that costs associated with U.S. port 
closures resulting from a detonated WMD could amount to 1 trillion USD, assuming a 
prolonged economic slump due to an enduring change in our ability to trade.  
Currently, the undisputed leader of the maritime terrorism nightmare scenarios 
is an attack with a weapon of mass destruction voyaging to its target not on the tip of 
a missile but hidden in a container on board of a large container ship. Number two on 
the list is the “floating bomb” scenario, that is, a hijacked liquefied petroleum gas 
(LPG) or liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker driven into a major port and exploded 
there, with the intent of disrupting seaborne global trade. The number three position is 
currently held by the “momentum weapon” scenario, which revolves around a large 
ship such as an ultra-large crude carrier or a chemical tanker. In such a case, the ter-
rorists would attempt to drive a large vessel into the harbour at high speed to ram 
either other ships with vulnerable cargoes or oil terminals and the like and then deto-
nate the ship. Such a scenario has been developed, for example, for the port of Singa-
pore, home of South- east Asia’s largest oil refineries. All of these maritime megater-
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rorism scenarios have one thing in common: they still firmly belong to the realm of 
fiction.27 
The threat scenario of a containerised WMD is delivered to US seaports arose in 
the 90s, or even earlier, however this have properly been analysed as part of the fol-
low-up gap analyses of 9/11. Although such incident, or even attempted assault has 
never been detected, the threat was considered as possible and real. 
The conjunction of three trends—globalization of industry, trade, and transport; 
proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, and the threatening rise of globally dis-
persed, WMD-armed, undeterred terrorism—today present an unprecedented threat to 
the United States, all its trading partners, and the whole civilized world.28 
One of the latest warnings of a “real and current” threat of terrorist attacks in-
volving WMD smuggled in innocent cargo was issued on 8 November, 2004 by Mo-
hamed El-Baradei, head of the United Nations’ International Atomic Energy Agency, 
at a conference on nuclear proliferation. He stated investigations in suspected 
weapons programmes had revealed an extensive global black market making radioac-
tive materials accessible to terrorists. His agency counted around 630 confirmed inci-
dents of trafficking in nuclear or other radioactive materials since 1993, leading to 
what he described as a “race against time” to forestall a terrorist attack. Analyses con-
cluded that Osama bin Laden was seeking to acquire nuclear weapons in order to ex-
pand the “attack arsenal” of Al-Qaeda.29  
Preventive measures 
As we have seen maritime containers represent a significant part of the interna-
tional trade and supply chain, which frames the backbone of the world economy sys-
tem. Containers transport involves numerous manufacturers, logistic nodes, operators, 
platforms and checkpoints (in particular container ports). To improve their security 
there are some requirement needs like an integrated research and development ap-
proach, including risk assessment, traceability, secure exchange between nations and 
across operators, and fast but effective screening. 
The sheer volume of international maritime container traffic, the sophisticated 
and often ingenious concealment methods, along with the diverse routings adopted by 
organised criminals like illicit drug traffickers and other commodity smugglers, in-
variably makes the successful interdiction very difficult. Seaports are notoriously dif-
ficult and at the same time dangerous places to work and law-enforcement structures 
are often hampered by a lack of resources, interagency mistrust, complex port pro-
cesses and systems, and other factors, which are purposefully exploited by criminal 
and terrorist organisations. This situation poses a very real and serious threat to the 
security of the international trade supply chain that plays so important role in the sus-
tainable development of the world economy that has high vulnerability on the logistic 
chains. 
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Container Security Initiative 
Challenges of border formalities in the ports 
Although the busiest container ports may be selected quite easily, time and area 
frames for inspection are very limited, just as the capacities available at the seaports 
where the enormous number of containerised cargo is delivered either as a final desti-
nation or for further shipping. In 2006, more than 11.6 million maritime containers 
arrived at United States seaports, an average of 32,000 a day.30 
The paradox of border formalities is that governments usually have separate and 
unequal processes for managing exports and imports. The high priority given export 
facilitation often results in reduced controls at departure. With clear revenue and se-
curity incentives to control incoming cargo, imports are more rigorously managed. 
Risk assessment for import cargo release is commonly performed after goods arrive at 
their port of entry.31  
Perspectives of cargo movements 
Encouraged by the WCO, leading nations are adopting a different perspective. 
Instead of viewing cargo movement as discrete departure and arrival transactions, 
they see it as an end-to-end, integrated process from point of manufacture to final de-
livery destination. Sometimes referred to as an “elastic border” model, customs in the 
arrival country expands its formal control horizon beyond physical borders – back to 
the shipment’s origin and forward to the ultimate delivery location. To facilitate this 
sort of international and public/private sector integration, the WCO has established 
standards for mutual recognition, certification and risk management.32 
Andrew Grainger highlighted the slight interest differences between the busi-
ness operators and the government agencies in providing security at the ports and 
along the supply chain. The challenge in reducing transaction costs and meeting regu-
latory control objectives – like those of increased security – is to consider how best to 
align the institutional framework with operational requirements. For government ag-
encies, as set out earlier, it is to make efficient use of finite enforcement resources, 
enhance controls at the border, extend controls up and down the supply chain, and to 
ensure that trade continues. For businesses, the management objective in supply chain 
management is about reducing costs and increasing value.33 CSI programme’s core 
part and distinct aim is an extension of the control (involving non-intrusive inspec-
tions and physical checks) upwards and downwards of the supply chain by erecting 
checkpoints at the most frequent ports where from the US-bound cargo is delivered to 
the American ports of entries. Many examples are known about such border exten-
sions at the land borders where for some reasons at one geographical point the border 
agencies of both neighbouring countries are present; one of them operating necessa-
rily at the other’s soil, but on their own customs territory. However, such an unexam-
pled co-operation has never been arranged in the spheres of sea borders, especially 
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not in so many ports in the same time that CSI concerns. American authorities devel-
oped this solution that may really be considered as a global one. 
CSI has multi purpose objectives like protection of the American people, soci-
ety and economy by securing the borders and protection of lawful trade, travel and 
immigration. CSI also promotes of national resilience by strengthening nationwide 
preparedness and response. It prevents of terrorism at ports of entry by pushing the 
US’s zone of security outward and beyond their physical borders through partnerships 
on extended border initiatives to deter and combat the threat of terrorism. CSI balan-
ces the legitimate trade and travel by promotion of industry and foreign government 
partnerships by engaging foreign governments, the trade community and others in the 
supply chain in cooperative relationships.34 
CSI’s structure has four core elements as follows:35 
1. Identify high-risk containers. CBP uses automated targeting tools to identify con-
tainers that pose a potential risk for terrorism, based on advance information and 
strategic intelligence. 
2. Pre-screen and evaluate containers before they are shipped. Containers are 
screened as early in the supply chain as possible, generally at the port of depar-
ture. 
3. Use technology to pre-screen high-risk containers to ensure that screening can be 
done rapidly without slowing down the movement of trade. This technology in-
cludes large-scale X-ray and gamma ray machines and radiation detection devices. 
4. Use smarter, more secure containers, which will allow CBP officers at United 
States ports of arrival to identify containers that have been tampered with during 
transit. 
Limited numbers of ports handling the mainstream of the traffic 
The more intensive traffic originates from the port, the higher priority for par-
ticipation in CSI programme. Although the containers arrive from various ports 
throughout the world, about 49 percent of U.S.-bound containers arrive from the top 
10 international ports.36 Until 2007 the number of CSI ports had been increased to 58 
of which covers 86 per cent of the container traffic.37 In 2002, roughly 7 million con-
tainers entered U.S. seaports creating about 87 percent of these ocean containers that 
entered 10 U.S. seaports only.38 
The second most frequent partner region for the U.S.-bound container traffic is 
Europe. The EU-US container traffic was concentrated in a relatively small number of 
ports, the most noticeable five ports are Rotterdam (NL), Hamburg (DE), Bre-
men/Bremerhaven (DE), Antwerp (BE), Valencia (ES) covering together more than a 
half of the total.39 
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This figure indicates that if traffic density is taken into consideration as risk in-
dicator (for instance by creating a Pareto chart) strong efficiency can reach at the very 
beginning of the project. A very few number of ports involvement causes high cover-
age in the container traffic. This strengthens the strong risk basis CSI programme 
should be built on. 
Security and Trade Facilitation 
CBP has to perform this security and border-related work while facilitating the 
flow of legitimate trade and travel that is so important to the U.S. economy. In other 
words, Customs has “twin goals”— building more secure and more efficient borders. 
The CSI program benefits from the greater exchange of customs-to-customs in-
formation resulting from bilateral cooperation and international awareness established 
to secure global trade. Further, a generally positive perception exists that CSI is a dy-
namic, flexible program that promises to neutralise large-scale threats and intercept 
high-risk containers while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade. 
Organisational changes in the security system 
Because of its core frontline responsibilities for inspection at US border cross-
ing points (BCP), the US Customs Service assumed the lead role in improving ocean 
container security and reducing the vulnerabilities associated with the overseas supply 
chain. By January 2002, Customs had initiated the CSI program and also Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) to enhance the security of the global 
supply chain and deter international acts of terrorism, as well as facilitate the smooth 
passage of commerce across US borders. The purpose of CSI is to enable Customs to 
screen for high-risk containers in key ports overseas, while the purpose of C-TPAT is 
to improve global supply chain security in the private sector.40 
In March 2003, the US Customs Service (USCS) was transferred to the new 
Department of Homeland Security and other federal law-enforcement agencies have 
also been reorganised likewise. The border inspection functions of the Customs Ser-
vice, along with other US government agencies with border protection responsibili-
ties, were arranged into the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. The scenario 
that effected among others, this structural reform is known worldwide. We do not fo-
cus here on the sequence of events stipulated a new paradigm in security thinking. 
What we explain here is more about the effect on the trade supply chain and the bor-
der security. We also would express here certain efforts willing to reduce the risks of 
the international transportation systems aiming to serve trade facilitation and security 
in wider manner in the same time.  
To implement CSI, CBP negotiated and entered into bilateral arrangements with 
foreign governments, specifying the placement of CBP officials at foreign ports and 
the exchange of information between CBP and foreign customs administrations. CBP 
first solicited the participation of the 20 foreign ports that shipped the highest volume 
of ocean containers to the United States. These top 20 ports are located in 14 count-
ries and regions and shipped a total of 66 percent of all containers that arrived in U.S. 
seaports in 2001. CBP has since expanded CSI to strategic ports step by step up to 58 
ports. These new ones, which may ship lesser amounts of cargo, but may also have 
terrorism or geographical concerns.  
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To participate in CSI, a host nation must meet several criteria. The host nation 
must utilise a seaport that has regular, direct and substantial container traffic to ports 
in the United States. There must be a competent Customs staff with the authority and 
capability of inspecting cargo originating in or transiting through its country, and  
there should be installed nonintrusive inspection equipment with gamma- or X-ray 
capabilities and radiation detection equipment. Additionally, each potential CSI port 
must indicate a commitment to establishing an automated risk management system, 
and they have to be ready to share critical data, intelligence, and risk management in-
formation with CBP officials. They have to conduct a crosscutting port assessment to 
ascertain vulnerable links in a port’s infrastructure and commit to resolving those vul-
nerabilities. Host country should also maintain a program to prevent, identify, and 
combat breaches in employee integrity. 
To prepare for implementation of CSI, CBP sends an assessment team to each 
potential CSI port to collect information about the port’s physical and information 
infrastructure, the host country’s customs operations, and the port’s strategic signifi-
cance to the United States. CBP then deploys a CSI team, which generally consists of 
three types of officials—special agents, targeters, and intelligence analysts. These of-
ficials come from either CBP or U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).41  
The collaboration between Customs administrations improves their capabilities 
and increases the overall effectiveness of the targeting process. The mutual goal is to 
target containerized cargo that poses a potential risk for terrorism and secure maritime 
trade from acts of terrorism. 
Inspections 
The large volume of imports and the Customs’ limited resources make it im-
practical to inspect all oceangoing containers without disrupting the flow of com-
merce. It is unrealistic to expect that all containers warrant such inspection because 
each container poses a different level of risk based on a number of factors including 
the exporter, the transportation providers, and the importer. CBP has implemented an 
approach to container security that attempts to focus resources on particularly risky 
cargo while allowing other cargo to proceed. 
CBP’s domestic efforts to target cargo to determine the risk it poses rely on in-
telligence, historical trends, and data provided by ocean carriers and importers. Pursu-
ant to federal law, CBP requires ocean carriers to electronically transmit cargo mani-
fests to CBP’s Automated Manifest System 24 hours before the cargo is loaded on a 
ship at a foreign port. This information is used in the Automated Targeting System 
(ATS). ATS is characterized by CBP as a rule-based expert system that serves as a 
decision support tool to assess the risk of sea cargo. In addition, CBP requires import-
ers to provide entry-level pre-arrival data that is used also by ATS to screen all con-
tainers to determine whether they pose a risk of containing WMD.42 
High tech detectors in service 
In general there are two types of inspections that CBP inspectors may employ 
when examining cargo containers: non-intrusive inspections (NII) and physical exam-
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inations. The NII involves the use of X-ray or gamma-ray scanning equipment at 
least. This sort of equipment is supposed to scan a container and generate an image of 
its contents according to the density pictured. Customs inspectors are to review the 
image to detect any anomalies, such as if the density of the contents of the container is 
not consistent with the description of the contents. If an anomaly is apparent in the 
image of the container, inspectors are to decide whether to conduct a physical exam-
ination of the container.43 Inspectors use additionally radiation detection devices to 
detect the presence of radioactive or nuclear material as well as explosive detectors.  
CBP extended its targeting and inspection activities to overseas seaports by the 
use of the principle of elastic borders.  
Announced in January 2002, CSI was implemented to allow CBP officials to 
target containers at overseas seaports so that any high-risk containers may be in-
spected prior to their departure for US destinations.  
 
Sustainability 
Security remains a major consideration for shipping. While enhanced security 
measures in transport and across supply chains are now part of doing business, some 
developments – especially at the national and regional level – have implications for a 
globalized industry such as shipping.  
One such current issue is cargo scanning, with its related questions of technical 
feasibility and economic viability, and, more importantly, the questions of trade-
friendliness, balance, and the level playing field that should exist, especially for 
smaller players in developing regions. In this context, the United States’ 100-per-cent 
container-scanning initiative, which requires foreign ports to scan all containers 
bound for the United States, is of particular concern, especially for trading partners of 
the United States, for the transport industry and for traders and shippers.  
DHS and CBP established the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) to test the feasi-
bility of scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers, but face challenges 
expanding the program. In October 2009, GAO reported that CBP has made progress 
in working with the SFI ports (formerly referred as CSI ports) to scan U.S.-bound 
cargo containers; but because of challenges implementing scanning operations, such 
as equipment breakdowns, the feasibility of scanning 100 percent of U.S.- bound 
cargo containers remains largely unproven.44 
Trials at a number of foreign ports show that the technology required scanning 
containers automatically and effectively does not yet exist. The measure is also costly, 
as illustrated by the figures put forward by the European Commission, which estimate 
that investment until 2020 would require $280 million, while operational costs would 
amount to $270 million annually. Recognizing these difficulties, the Department of 
Homeland Security announced in December 2009 that it would postpone the manda-
tory application of this requirement until 2014.45 
The most experts criticises 100 per cent container scanning proposal. The US 
SAFE Port Act requires 100 per cent scanning of all US-bound container cargo by 
2014 using non-intrusive inspection equipment, including imaging equipment (X-rays 
or gamma scanners) to create images of the containers' contents, and radiation detec-
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tion equipment at foreign ports. A pilot program to test the feasibility of 100 per cent 
scanning has been conducted at six selected CSI ports. While in theory the physical 
inspection of the contents of every container provides the best determination of a se-
curity risk, it is also one of the most costly and labour-intensive measures to imple-
ment. To illustrate the magnitude of the task, of more than 7 million containers that 
entered the US in 2002, approximately 10 per cent were inspected and scanned (up 
from 2 per cent prior to 9/11). In Rotterdam the figure is about 5 per cent and in the 
UK it is between 4 and 7 per cent reported OECD in 2005. Many customs administra-
tions undertake 100 per cent screening of containers in the sense that the associated 
information is screened, but none physically examine 100 per cent of their container 
traffic, either through the use of scanning equipment or otherwise. Indeed, this would 
be impossible with currently available technology and the volumes of containerised 
trade. The proposal for 100 per cent scanning in the current maritime operating envi-
ronment represents the antithesis of risk management. On the other hand, screening, 
which in many cases is now fully automated, forms an integral part of an appropriate 
risk management regime that assists in identifying those containers, which may pose a 
security (or other) risk, and are therefore candidates for scanning and inspection. The 
24-Hour Rule (pre-arrival data) and similar requirements for advance information 
contributes to the screening process and the early identification of high-risk cargo. 
The difficulties of achieving 100 per cent scanning coupled with physical inspection 
have been highlighted by a number of national and international organisations includ-
ing the US General Accounting Office (GAO) and the OECD.46 
100 per cent container-scanning initiative that requires foreign ports to scan all 
containers bound for the United States, is of particular concern, especially for trading 
partners of the United States, for the transport industry and for traders and shippers. 
Trials at a number of foreign ports show that the technology required to scan contain-
ers automatically and effectively does not yet exist. The measure is also costly, as il-
lustrated by the figures put forward by the European Commission47, which estimate 
that investment until 2020 would require $280 million, while operational costs would 
amount to $270 million annually. Recognizing these difficulties, the Department of 
Homeland Security announced in December 2009 that it would postpone the manda-
tory application of this requirement until 2014.48 
Container scanning equipment can increase the number of consignments that re-
ceive customs attention without causing undue delay, and can identify illicit goods. 
The equipment requires a large capital outlay, however, and the process of introduc-
ing it, from conception through operation, affects the entire control and intelligence 
sectors and requires changes to the infrastructure and procedures of customs. To jus-
tify the outlay, and to ensure maximum return for the investment, it is necessary to 
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ensure that scanning equipment is used effectively and that it is fully integrated into 
the risk assessment regime.49 
Summary 
International and domestic incidents over the recent years have emphasized the need 
for an integrated approach to supply chain security management. Just as a chain is no 
stronger than its weakest link, a supply chain is only as secure as its weakest link, 
which includes the suppliers, manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, carriers, terminals, 
and governmental organisations that plan, manage, facilitate, and monitor the global 
movement of goods. 
Massive improvements have been done globally in result of the changing se-
curity environment after 9/11. One groups of these relates to the known and real se-
curity gaps, participants of the international shipping industry were unable (or some-
times simple reluctant) to solve. These gained a strong motive to be reactively solved. 
Another groups were when theoretical threats were identified, and efforts were pro-
actively taken to prevent such events.  
Although the lead was taken by the U.S., the practices, new ideas and technical 
means spread all over the world. As a result of this, and also because the significantly 
strengthened security in the U.S.-bound container traffic that is a very large part of the 
global traffic volume, U.S. security efforts has global impact. This may be considered 
as an absolutely positive fact. 
Despite the Container Security Initiative programme was designed on a risk ba-
sis in many aspects, one of the core element of the programme – the 100 per cent 
scanning – is not in line with that principle. It seems to be, however, that the decision 
makers recognised it and hanged over to achieve it on a temporary basis. In the time 
frame available due, other procedures may be worked out instead. 
The containerised trade supply chain shows characteristics of a critical infra-
structure. It is the researchers responsibility50 not to cut off their work on the con-
tainer security issues. They should report all the changes in the security environment 
and the security gaps newly identified. 
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